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AMERICAN LEGISLATION FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES*
By Carl I. Wheat"
ARBITRATION-THE METHOD.
L

ARBITRATION NOT A NEW IDEA.

ITS USE IN COMMERCIAL AND

INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.

Neither the term nor the mode of procedure which we call
arbitration is a new phenomenon. The term has a fixed and
definite technical meaning, and for centuries has been used in
English law to denote a certain mode of procedure. The significance of the word, thus settled in the common law of England, was
carried over to us in connection with our legal inheritance from
the mother country long before it was first used in connection with
industrial disputes, and our legal books are full of references
both to the word and to the method.
"Arbitration," says Bouvier,' is "the investigation and determination of a matter or matters of difference between contending
parties, by one or more unofficial persons, chosen by the parties,
These arbitrators are not
and called arbitrators or referees."
bound to decide the matters before them in accordance with the
rules of law or equity, unless the agreement to submit the dispute to them contains some such stipulation. In general, therefore, it may be said that arbitration implies the voluntary agreement by contending parties to submit a matter in controversy to
the judgment of a usually informal tribunal made up, at least
in part, of persons not parties to the dispute, who are, by the
agreement, given the authority to decide the dispute, it usually
being agreed in advance by the parties that such decision will be
final. When the consent of one of the parties to this extrajudicial procedure is enforced by law, the proecss is termed com* This is the first of a series of articles on this subject. They consist of chapters
from a forthcom ng book which is to be published as one of the new series of Harvard
Studies in Administrative Law.
* Member of the Los Angeles, Calif. bar.
1 LAW DICTIONARY.
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pulsory arbitration. This is very seldom done, however, andl
mutual, voluntary consent is an essential part of most references.
to arbitration. He to whom the submission is made is called an
Arbitrator, and his determination is styled an Award.
Although this method known as arbitration is a well-known
part of the common law, to be found in the digests under the
title "Arbitration and Awards," there is also a statutory forn
of arbitration, regarding which the statute-books of most of our
States possess provisions. These enactments usually prescribe.
methods for the selection of the arbitrators, what the submission
must contain in order to be binding on both parties, and when and
how the award shall be made, and they often provide for the.
calling of witnesses by the arbitrator, and for his compensation.
Most of these laws are founded upon the English statutes2 under
which matters in dispute nay be referred to arbitrators, the.
submission being enforced as if it had been a rule of the court.
Such statutory arbitration is generally utilized, if at all, in con-,
nection with commercial disputes, between merchants or traders,
or in cases where a contract includes a stipulation to submit
certain matters to. arbitration.
Prior to these statutes, however, arbitration did not in England
have a continuously successful existence. The pendulum of court
recognition has swung back and forth several times since the
use of arbitration began. At first the courts were not adverse to.
enforcing arbitration clauses in contracts, but by the time ofQueen Elizabeth the doctrine had become established that either
party to such a contract to arbitrate could revoke his promise at
any time before the actual award, and plaintiffs who complained
of such actions were told that they could not, by their own wills,
or by their contracts, "oust the courts of their jurisdiction" to
decide such disputes as might arise. Recently, however, by such
statutes as are mentioned above, contracts to leave disputes of.
interpretation to impartial arbitrators have been fostered and are
now often encouraged by courts as well as by legislatures. 3
2 9 & 10 WILLIam III, c. 15; 3 & 4 WLLIAM IV, c. 42, § 49.
3 For material regarding the law of Arbitration and Award, and its application to
commercial

disputes, the

following

works may be consulted :-"Report of Special

Committee on the Lawyers' Court of Compulsory Arbitration," ALLEGHENY COUxnr
(PENN.) BAR ASS'N, 1909; MAZEW BACON. COmPLEAT ARBITRATOR, London, 1731,

1744 and 1770; JOHN M. BELL, LAW O' ARBITRATION IN SCOTLAND, Edinburg, 1861'
and 1877; SLDNBY BxLLNG, LAW OF AWARDS AND ARBITRATION, London, 1845;
JAMES S. CALDWELL, LAW OF ARBITRATION, London, 1825 (also Am. eds. 1822, 1853.) ;
JuLIus HENRY COHEN, COMmERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAw, New York, 1918;
WILLI.M

OUTRAM

CREW,

LAW O

ARBITRATION;

THE
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But arbitration is not confined to this common-law or statutory
method of determining the issues of commercial disputes. In one
form of another the method called arbitration has been known
from the earliest periods. The ancestor of the Arab Shiek judging
the disputes of his fellows, was applying the method of arbitration,
his "judgment" was not based upon any principles of law, but
upon his sense of justice regarding the particular case voluntarily
submitted to him by the parties. Also, very early instances are
recorded of its use in cases of dispute between states or nations,-the method still known as international arbitration. Probably the
earliest example of the use of this method of settling disputes of
which we possess any record is an incident of the life of those
early Sumerian peoples who inhabited the Euphrates Valley long
before the raise of Babylon. On this occasion, says a very early
clay tablet, in order to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between
the two powerful city-states of Umma and Lagesh, Mesilim, King
of Kish, stepped into the breach, possibly at the request of the
two disputants, and decided for them a troublesome boundary
question over which there had been frequent friction. Mesilim
reigned at least before 3000 B. C., a thousand years before the
days of Hammurabi, the lawgiver of Babylon.'
Examples of the use of this method have come down to us fronx
the Greeks. Thucydides, the historian of the Peloponnesian War,
says that Archidamus, King of Sparta, stated that "it was unlawful to attack an enemy who offered to answer for his acts before a
notes, rules, forms cases. London, 1890 and 1898; MONTAGUE R. EMANUEL,
PRINCIPLES os ARBITRATION: a manual of the law relating thereto, London, 1910;
STEWVART KYD, LAW os AWARDS, London, 1799 (also Am.ed. 1808) ; HENRY FOULiS
LYNCH, REDRESS BY ARBITRATION, London, 1912; PETER LINDSAY MILLER, LAW Os.
ARBITRATION IN SCOTLAND, Glasgow, 1917; JOHN TORREY MORSE, JR., LAW Os.
ARBITRATION AND AWARD, Boston, 1872; PROBYN, LESLIE and EvANs, L. WOaTHINGTON, PRACTICE OF THE LONDON CHAMBER Os ARBITRATION, London, 1892; L. 0.
P. PYEMONT, ARBITRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA BY STATUTE AND AT COMMON LA ,.
Johannesburg, 1914; JOSEPH HAWORTH REDMAN, LAW os ARBITRATION AND AWARDS,
London, 1872, 1884, 1897, and (4 ed.) 1903; ARTHUR R. RUDELL, DUTIES AND.
POWERS OF AN ARBITRATOR IN THE CONDUCT OF A REFERENCE, London, 1907;
BENJAMIN RUSH, OPINION UPON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ACT Os THE ASSEMBLY
ENTITLED AN ACT TO REGULATE ARBITRATIONS AND PROCEEDINGS IN COURTS Os
JUSTICE, Philadelphia, 1807; FRANCIS RUSSELL, POWER AND DUTY OF AN ARBITRATOR AND THE LAW OF SUBMISSIONS AND AWARDS, London, 10 eds., the last in 1919
(edited by A. A. Hudson); JOSHUA SLATER, LAW Os ARBITRATION AND AWARDS,
London, 1883, 1886, 1898, 1905; JOHN P. H. SOPER, TREATISE ON THE LAW AND.
PRACTICE Os' ARBITRATION AND AWARDS, London, 1907; ARCHIBALD J. STEPHENS,
LAW Os . . o ARBITRATION AND AWARDS, London, 1842 (also Am. ed., 1844.);
Was. H. WATSON, LAW Os ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS, 1825, 1836, 1846; JOHN
WrLSoN, LAW RELATIVE TO ARBITRATION, Hull, 1792; FREDERICK WOOD, DIGEST
OF THE LAW Os' ARBITRATION, SUBMISSIONS AND AWARDS, London. 1889.
In addition, the recent publications of the American Judicature Sneiety contain
See
much valuable material for the American student of Commercial Arbitration.

the JOURNAL of that Society for June, 1918. See also REGINALD H. SMITH, JUSTICB.
AND THE POOR, 68, et seq.
4 See L. W. KING, A HISTORY OF SUMER AND AnHAD, c. The Dawn of History,.
101.
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Tribunal of Arbitration", and one of the earliest instances of an
international treaty containing arbitration provisions was the
fifty year treaty of alliance between Argos and Lacedaemon, which
contained a clause providing that in case any difference should
arise between the parties to the contract, they should let the
matter be arbitrated by a neutral power, "in accordance with the
ustom of their ancestors."
The Romans knew and utilized the method of arbitration.
Roman Emporers frequently preserved the peace of the world by
their arbitraments, while in the case of commercial disputes, they
had a well developed system. The Praetor periodically selected
from, a panel or list of citizens, a certain number, who were
given authority to decide such disputes as parties might desire to
bring before them. These arbitrators possessed a certain public
character, and their judgments were final.
In later days the Popes often acted as arbitrators between
nations; and in mediaeval times warring city-states and small
principalities were often brought to accord by the action of some
powerful neighbor in arbitrating the dispute. In our own times
the desire for international arbitration has spread enormously,
and between 1815 and the end of the nineteenth century there
were some sixty instances of international arbitration, to thirtytwo of which the United States was a party. Now many treaties
contain clauses obligating the parties to have recourse to arbitration in all save a few seemingly fundamental questions, such as
national honor.and independence. The Hague Tribunal of International Arbitration has done liuch to prevent war. The League
of Nations, and its projected International Tribunal will no
doubt go farther in this direction than has ever before been
attempted.
II.

INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION.

In the preceding section we have been speaking of arbitration
in two senses, neither of them directly connected with the solution
Or adjustment of industrial disputes. An understanding of them,
however, is necessary for a clear comprehension of such procedure.
These have been the arbitration of international controversies,
usually by independent sovereigns not connected with the dispute,
but at times by formal bodies such as the Hague International
Tribunal; and the arbitration of commercial controversies usually

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol27/iss1/5
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as a result of provisions in contracts that such disputes would be
referred to some impartial third person for decision. In the ease
of industrial disputes, the term arbitration has also been used, and
here it implies the submission of the difficulty to the judgment
of an impartial third person or board, whose decision is presumably final. Unlike the methods of arbitration in commercial and
in international disputes, the use of the method in connection with
industrial disputes is a comparatively new thing. It is the application of an old method to a new phenomenon,--i. e. the phenomenon of industrial warfare.
This phenomenon is of comparatively recent development. During the middle ages what manufacturing was done was in the
hands of a class of small employers. Before the rise of the
factory system, it was, in fact, rare for a master to have more
than two or three journeymen or apprentices under him, and
in the vast majority of cases the master worked alone, selling his
product wherever he could find a market. Speaking of this
period, Gilman says:
"The craftsmen who kept at work any considerable number of journeymen and apprentices were thus comparatively
few, and the latter were not numerous enough to create a
labor problem between employer and employed. This was as
true of seventeenth-century England or of colonial America as
of eighteenth-century France or Germany." 5
Industrial disputes as we now know them could not, in the nature
of things, arise so long as this situation obtained. So long as the
personal relationship between master and man continued, disputes
were personal matters. In England the rate of wages was often
fixed by law, and a dissenting employee was either discharged
or thrown into jail. There was no combination among the workmen to better their condition, for most of them aspired to become masters themselves before very long. Thus, while the
personal relation continued, and while this transition from man
to master was comparatively simple, there could be no "labor
troubles", and- therefore no strikes as we know them today.
With the invention of machinery, however, and the rise of
large manufacturing establishments, the old personal touch was
lost, and a large class of professional laborers with identical interests appeared. They could, in most cases, never become employers
'METHODS

OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE 6.
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themselves, as the increased cost of the tools of production precluded the former easy transition from man to master. The product now sold by the laborer was his labor, and it was sold in
exchange for wages, whereas the product sold by the master workman of former days had been exchanged for price. This is a vital
distinction, and before the creation of a labor-selling class of
workers in any country there is no foundation for a true labor
problem. A definite separation of interest between employer and
employee now became manifest. The personal relationship disappeared. No longer was long apprenticeship and a considerable
degree of skill required of the workman, for the machine did the
real work, the workman merely tending it and supplying it with
material.
The development of machinery brought with it the development
of the factory type of organization in most of the great industries.
It was not long before the hordes of workers who thronged the
factories began to realize that only by combination and concerted
effort could they better their lot. The first efforts to accomplish
such combination on any very large scale were answered in England by the passage of the severe Combination Laws of 1800, which
until their repeal in 1824 forbade the combination of workmen to
better their position in any way. Many men and women were
imprisoned or transported to penal colonies, some for the most
trival offenses, which were held to be illegal "combination" by
a judiciary partial to the employers. It was dangerous for one
workman even to converse with another regarding irksome condi,
tions or low wages. Repression was used on every possible
occasion.
In the United States, however, the presence of an almost unlimited supply of free land to which the disgruntled workman could turn to better his lot, together with a somewhat greater
spirit of democracy, prevented such harsh measures. Even here,
however, the law did not regard labor combinations with favor.
Perhaps it was with a certain prescience that the judges of those
days almost unanimously decried the use of the power of organization and concerted action by workmen, and punished such actions
wherever possible as deeds of conspiracy.
Organization, on the part of the workingmen, was a sine qua non
to the development of arbitration in industrial disputes, for before
such organization there were no such disputes worthy of the name
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to be arbitrated. Not until the recognition by the workingmen
of their needs, expressed in organizations so formed that it was
possible concertedly to make serious demands upon the employers,
was there such a thing as an industrial dispute in the modern
sense of the term.
HI.

LEGISLATING AGAINST INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES.

Like several other instances in the history of our law, the courts
found themselves at a loss to deal with these new phenomena. The
older conceptions of the law, such as conspiracy, were pressed into
use, but hardly fitted the changed situation, and just as two
centuries earlier the common law had floundered about in the
morass of the then new problems of the law merchant and of
insurance, so at the time of the industrial revolution the judges
found themselves undecided. The common law has been called an
elastic law, but the inability of the English courts to deal with
the problems of the law merchant in the seventeenth-century led
to the rise of equity, and the inability of the same courts later to
deal with the problems of the new order in industry lea very
largely to the great use of the legislative method of changing the
common law during the nineteenth century. This inability of the
ordinary courts to deal with these new problems thus forced these
questions into the stage of open warfare and self-help, or into the
hands of extra-legal arbitrators. The common law has ever been
fixed, conservative, and comparatively unyielding, notwithstanding
the claim of its elasticity. True, it has never broken, and it has
changed and developed slowly, but it has always found it difficult
to assimilate totally new fields of action, such as it met with here.
Appalled by the possibilities of labor organization, public sentiment favored the use of legislation regarding industrial disputes.
Repression in the form of entirely forbidding strikes or lockouts
did not prove successful, but even today every year sees new legislative attempts to deal with the problem. Gilman says:
"There is plainly a growing sentiment among Englishspeaking people that labor disputes should in some measure
be brought within the field of law, and no longer continue
anomalous and lawless: that trade unions and employers should
not be allowed-to fight out their quarrels, whatsoever the injury
to the public may be. The time is ripe for emphatic assertion
of the rights of the public. The adjustment of labor difficul-
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ties should be left primarily in the hands of the employer and
the trade union. But if they will not settle them speedily
and peaceably, then the public must and will find a more
effectual way." 6
Three-fourths of our States and three dependencies now possess
laws on their statute books which aim to deal with this problem.
Local Boards of Arbitration have been legalized, and their establishment made easy; State Boards of Arbitration and Conciliation
have been created; public investigation of labor disputes has
been attempted, and now one State prohibits strikes or lockouts
in essential industries. And yet the "strike balance sheet" is
continually showing a greater and greater debit. Can the legislative methods succeed? That is our question.
It so happened, that, in the United States, the earlier period of
discussion regarding arbitration roughly coincided with this rise
of public confidence in the efficacy of legislation as a means of
developing the law. Formerly denounced and disbelieved in, the
legislative method grew in favor during the latter half of the
nineteenth-century, and men began to seek relief for their difficulties in great examples of social legislation. The Interstate Commerce Act (1887), the Sherman Anti-trust law (1890), and the
first Federal Industrial Arbitration law (1888) are all illustrations of the growing use of this method by the federal government at this time. In the next chapter the early American legislation on the subject of industrial disputes will be discussed at
length. Here it will suffice to remark that the results obtained by
the use of this method in this country have all been more or less
disappointing to those who desired an era of absolute industrial
peace. Born of fear in the aftermath of some great strike, or of
the desire of some hack legislator to set his name over a law which
might draw the "labor vote", most of these statutes disclose an
absolute lack of understanding of the economic principles underlying industrial disputes.
In no case which the writer has been able to discover was one
of these statutes based upon any thorough study of the economies
of the problem. In fact, during the first twenty years of this
legislation, ten States (California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Lousiana, Montana, Minnesota, Ohio, Utah and Wisconsin) copied in
every essential the provisions of the Massachusetts Act, under
6 Ibid.,

Preface, VI.
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which a "State Board of Conciliation, and Arbitration" had
achieved a moderate success. The framers of thesd laws did not
attempt to learn to what factors this local success was due, but
copied the law in the blind faith that what would work in Massachusetts would work in their States. We shall examine the experience of Massachusetts later, to learn, if possible, whether her
seeming success was, after all, real or not. That the method followed by the other States was not an efficacious one, however,
is easy to see from the fact that in not one of the States mentioned
did the body created achieve anything like a conspicuous success ;.
and in most cases it died a natural death shortly after its creation. New Jersey, Michigan and Connecticut had meanwhile fol
lowed the lead of New York in establishing a somewhat different
type of body, but the same experience followed, and in 1901, in
the Report of the Industrial Commission of the Federal Govern.
ment 7 we read that only the laws of Illinois, Indiana (which
had a scheme all her own), Ohio, Wisconsin, New York and
Massachusetts could "be considered as exercising any important
influence upon industrial relations." Since that time the Illinois
Board was practically dormant during many years; the Indiana.
Commission has been abolished because it was unsuccessful; the.
Ohio and Massachusetts Boards have been consolidated with other
State Departments and industrial dispute adjustment forms but a
fractional part of their work; in Wisconsin a new method is being
tried after many years of "innocuous desuetude" on the part ofthe old Board; and in New York, after many changes, an attempt,
recently has been made to resuscitate the somewhat languishing
body which originally began its work in 1886.
In all these cases the Boards themselves have been the first to
admit that their greatest success has been in the way of informal
mediation, and that the method of arbitration, for which they
were usually constructed, has not proved successful in any but
a few scattering cases. For the same reason that a strong labor
movement is only possible in a large center of population, where
many workers live in a closely-knit community, these bodies are
able to succeed only in such centers. As the continued use of arbitration or mediation is only possible where labor is organized
sufficiently strongly to make serious demands, or to defend itself
against its employers, a system attempting to use these methods
Vol. X-vi,

pt. 1, c. 2.
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can only succeed, if at all, where there is a closely-knit industrial
community, well organized. This situation is found in such States
as Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, and it is
in these States that industrial arbitration through State-created
agencies has met its greatest success. Governors may continue to
send messages to their legislatures demanding legislation which
-will put an end to strikes, and lawmakers may debate forever,
but without these requisite industrial factors no possible scheme
can prove successful in the long run. Thus in States like California, and Colorado, where the industrial sections are widely
separated or perhaps isolated from the rest of the community,
or in Iowa, Kansas, or North Dakota, which are largely agricultural, very little could be accomplished by utilizing machinery
'which had worked to some degree in the more industrial States.
IV.

ARBIR TION-AN UNSUCCFSFUL METHOD.

We have traced the extensive use of the method called arbitration in the various spheres of commercial, international, and industrial disputes. Yet nowhere has this method been a pronounced
or conspicuous success. Commercial arbitration, preached for
three hundred years, still lacks the confidence of the great majority
of merchants; international arbitration, notwithstanding a popular demand for its use, fails in the great crises and wars still
result, increasingly terrible as the years pass by; and, finally,
industrial arbitration fails to rid us of the strike or lockout, and
the bodies constructed especially for this purpose find their
most useful sphere in informal mediation or conciliation rather
than in the more formal arbitration. Why has arbitration failed?
In this question we near the crux of our problem, and the reasons
for failure must be explored before the history of American industrial legislation can be read with understanding.
The first pertinent objection to arbitration as a method lies in
the transitory and consensual nature of its so-called tribunals.
An arbitrator does not even have the background of the Arab
Shiek on which to build his award. The Shiek at least has the
Koran, but an arbitrator often comes without too great knowledge
-of the problems involved in the particular dispute, and in any
'case he can rely on no large body of rules and principles such as
guide a judge to his decision. His chief aim is to settle the dis-
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pute before him in a peaceful manner. The possibilities of similar
disputes in the future do not concern him. The methods used by
his predecessor in the work have no particular meaning. His
job is to see that the peace is kept. To accomplish this purpose
he exercises his arbitrary judgment.
This very arbitrariness of the arbitrator's method shows how
contra it runs to the whole current of Anglo-American history.
The Anglo-Saxon race has always been particularly jealous of
arbitrary action by courts and judges. Innumerable instances
might be mentioned to illustrate this fact. The fixed rules of the
common law from long before the period of Queen Elizabeth
almost to the present day, and the strict modes of procedure
that still exist in many jurisdictions, bear witness to this fear
of arbitrary action by courts, the judge often being little more
than a rubber stamp with almost no discretion at all. "The
intense desire to exclude the personality of the magistrate for the
time being at almost any cost," says Pound, "has left its mark
8
on the law beyond any other factor in lawmaking. "
Much of the distrust of equity by the early settlers of New England was based upon this desire. Echoing this feeling, Selden,
said:
"Equity is a roguish thing; for the law we have a measure,
know what to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of
him that is chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so
is equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make his foot the
standard. For if the measure we call a chancellor's foot,
what an uncertain measure this would be. One chancellor has
a long foot, another a short foot, another an indifferent
foot; 'tis the same thing in the chancellor's conscience." 9
Like early equity, then, to the present day there is nothing to
hold an arbitrator from exercising any judgment which he may
desire. An arbitrator does not think in terms of law and justice,
but merely to bring to a peaceful conclusion the very dispute before him. In this his position is similar to that of the English jury
during the early seventeenth-century, whose discretion was very
great. Thus in the case of Hixt v. Goats, 'o where the plaintiff
brought an action on the Covenant for £700, the jury found only
£400 damages. To the objections of the plaintiff's counsel, Lord
Coke answered that in equity there might be many reasons why the
s Roscoe Pound, "Justice Science and the Law", 31 Hnv. L. REv. 1048, 1060.
o TABLE TALIC, published about 1654.
Rolle, 257 (K. B. 1615).

10
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plaintiff should not have the full sum, adding, "For it seems here
that the jurors are chancellors",-and the judgment was affirmed.
Shortly after this time, however, in the case of Wood v. Gunston,",
in an action for slander, the jury awarded a plaintiff the very excessive sum of £1500, and the judge, after argumqnt as to this
action by the jury, allowed a new trial, one of the earliest cases
of such action in our law. Sedgwick says:
"It is in truth but slowly, and at comparatively a recent
period, that the jury has relinquished its control over even
actions of contract, and that any approach has been made to a
fixed and legal measure of damage. But by degrees the
salutary principle hag been recognized, and it is now well
settled, that in all actions of contract-and in all cases of
tort where no evil motive is charged, the amount of compensation is to be regulated by the direction of the court, and the
jury cannot substitute their vague and arbitrary discretion
for the rules which the law lays down.' 12
In the unsatisfactory state of early jury cases, then, is the
method of arbitration at the present time. During the years
that have passed since Selden's day, the courts of equity have
developed a compendious body of rules and principles, and the
measure of justice is no longer a measure of the chancellor's
conscience, or of his foot. The Ecclesiastical Chancellors gave
way to a series of brilliant Common Law Chancellors, trained in
the system and methods of the common law, and bringing to
equity the lawyer's desire to follow well-trodden paths, and to
seek justice in consistency and an established set of rules and
doctrines rather than by seeking, in each particular case, to follow
a perhaps wayward conscience. In 1818 Lord Eldon, one of the
greatest of the Common Law Chancellors, remarked from the
bench:
"I cannot agree that the doctrines of this court are to be
changed with every succeeding judge. Nothing would inflict on me greater pain, in quitting this place, than the recollection that I had done anything to justify the reproach
that the
equity of this court varies like the Chancellor's
foot."1 3
But arbitration in still another way resembles an early period
of our law and this is in its consensual nature. The submission
x Style, 466 (1655.)
THE MEASRE OF DAMAGFS, 1 ed., 201-202.
18 Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402 (1818).
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of a dispute to arbitration is still purely voluntary with the parties,
whether it be commercial, international or industrial arbitration.
Thus was the submission to the early courts.
"Jurisdiction," says Sir Frederick Pollock, speaking of
early Anglo-Saxon tribunals, "began with being merely voluntary, derived not from the authority of the State but from the
consent of the parties. People might come to the court for a
decision if they agreed to do so. They were bound in honor
to accept the result; they might forfeit pledges deposited with
the court; but the court could not compel their obedience any
more than a tribunal of arbitration appointed at this day
under treaty between sovereign states can compel the rulers
of those states to fulfill its award." 14
It is for this reason, indeed, that international arbitration has
never proved a thoroughly satisfactory method for the solution of
international difficulties. The award of the arbitrators has too
often only been a species of compromise, not founded upon any
principles of justice, but determined rather by expediency in
placating one or both disputants. In commercial arbitration there
is, to be sure, behind the award the sanction of law, and the successful party may enforce it as a rule of court or is given a cause
of action for its breach.
"In either case," says a leading authority, regarding commercial arbitration, "there is behind the successful litigant the
power of the Judge to decree, and the power of the Executive
to compel compliance with the behest of the Arbitrator. There
exist elaborate rules of Court and provisions of the Legislature
governing the practice of arbitrations. In fine, such arbitration is a mode of litigation by consent, governed by law, stating from familiar rules, and carrying the full sanction of
Judicial decision. International Arbitration has Inone of
these characteristics. It is the cardinal principle of the law
of nations that each sovereign power, however politically
weak, is internationally equal to any other power, however
politically strong. There are no Rules of International Law
relating to Arbitration, and of the law itself there is no authoritative exponent nor any recognized authority for its enforcement. "15
This lack of coercive power behind the arbitrator is fatal to
international arbitration, asserts Sir Henry Maine adding:
Pollock, "English Law Before the Norman Conquest", 14 L. QuAl RIEv. 291.
21
is Lord Russell of Killowen, "International Law and Arbitration", REPOTS or
TXE AwERICAN BAa AsSOCrATION, 279 (1896).
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"Quasi-courts

of arbitration, constituted ad hoe, (i.e.,

for this particular case alone,) of necessity attend simply to
the question in immediate dispute, and do not weigh the
opinion they give regarded as a precedent" 18 and "A true
court of quasi-justice, like a court of municipal justice, would
be sure to consider the effect of a given decision on the whole
branch of the law which it administers. "7
For these reasons Maine argues for an international tribunal
of some degree of permanence, while Lord Russell urges against
this proposal the liability of nations to lose confidence in any
judges who might be set up to try the vast causes which would
come before such a court, and therefore argues for tribunals
constituted ad hoc but acting along common lines and with a settled
body of principles on which to base their judgments. Both agree
that international arbitration is not too successful a method
because, first, there is no coercive power behind its awards, and
second, there is no continuity of principle founding its judgments.
Turning now to the question of commercial arbitration, we
find a stiuation equally unsatisfactory. For many years the
method has had its able exponents, and legislation calculated
to make easy its use has taken its place upon the statute books
of most jurisdictions. Yet the use made of this method is insignificant as compared to the use of the courts. And here
again the reason is not far to seek. It is very difficult to
make the decisions of these arbitrators of commercial disputes
conclusive. In addition only a very exceptional man can long
retain the confidence which an arbitrator must necessarily have.
His decisions may show a bias in this or that direction, or such
a bias may be imagined. Usually there is no body of rules on
which he can base his judgments, and his chief aim thus becomes
peace,-anything to keep disputes from becoming too grave, anything to keep the parties from carrying their troubles to the courts.
Thus the arbitrator in commercial cases is in the position of the
Chancellor before the days of the great Common Law Chancellors
who brought order and system into the court of chancery by developing a series of rules and precedents, by the study) of which parties
could learn in advance what the "Social conscience" of the court
would be. He is, indeed, a minature Haroun al Rasehid, dispenslB INTERNATIONAL LAw,
7

Ibid., 218.

216.
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ing an ever-ready, and arbitrary "justice" to all who apply. Notwithstanding the reports of success from various sources, and notwithstanding the choice of very able men as arbitrators in many
instances, this method is still that of "Oriental justice," and
any "principles" used by one arbitrator are usually not used by
the next. Although beautiful in theory, the fact of the matter
is that in practice the commercial community has not as yet
accepted the method of commercial arbitration in any general
sense.
In industrial arbitration the same arguments obtain. Here
we have an embryonic form of adjudication, resembling in its
consensual nature the early Anglo-Saxon courts of England, and
in its lack of principles and standards the courts of chancery
before the days of the Common Law Chancellors. The result is
that the award is almost inevitably a compromise, in which the
arbitrators, anxious for a speedy and peaceful settlement of the
controversy before them, split-the-difference between demands and
offers. Nothing could be more demoralizing in the long rn.
The arbitral tribunal, we repeat, does not think in terms of law
and justice. In industrial disputes it desires merely to secure
immediate peace, whether in the way of resumption of industrial
activity, or a relinquishment of demands which might cause trouble
in the future. The important consideration is that, notwithstanding the peaceable adjustment of the dispute then going on, an
arbitration decision gives no guarantee that the peace will last any
longer than the time necessary to formulate new demands. As
one writer has put it:
"The underlying causes of wage disputes remain unaffected
by meditation and arbitration decisions, and capable at any
time of causing new disputes and of arousing still more unfriendly relations."I"
This same writer, in discussing the wage system of American
railroads says:
"The piling up of compromise on compromise results in a
haphazard, unscientific wage system unsatisfactory to all concerned. "19
l

3.
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He therefore urges the recognition of certain principles for the
determination of these questions:
"Some fundamental principles which may serve as the basis
of a fair and reasonable wage or of a just principle of wage
increase." 2 0
To which remark he adds:
"Of necessity, the result of such an attempt must be fragmentary and inconclusive; but the justification for the endeavor lies in the manifest need of some fundamental principle of
wages which may be applied in arbitration proceedings."21
To him, then, the methods in use under these statutes, not only
form at present no guarantee against the recurrence of disputes,
but actually makes such recurring disputes inevitable. Nor has
his conclusion been negatived by the creation of the Labor Board
under the Railroad Act of 1920. Just prior to its determination
of wage awards to affect the daily wages of 1,800,000 railroad
employees in July, 1920, the President of the Brotherhood of
Railroad Engineers, MTr. Warren S. Stone, is reported in the daily
press to have said,
"Any award now made will be a compromise award, I suppose. . . . Labor has three men on the board, but their
votes will be offset by the three men who represent capital.
The three that represent the public will actually settle matters very likely, and if they split one man will practically
determine it. 22 And his decree may be satisfactory for only
six months."1
v.

THE END OP LAW.

These conclusions may perhaps be brought out more clearly
if we take the time at this point to consider the development
of law as worked out by Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law
School in a series of articles recently printed in the Harvard
Law Review. 3 . Starting with the proposition that the object of
law is "the administration of justice," Dean Pound asks what
has been the "end" or purpose of law in its various stages of
Ibi,

xxiii.

XXV.
= THE BOSTON HERALD. July 11, 1920.

'Tid.,

2 Roscoe Pound, "The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines,"
27 HARv. L. REv. 195; "The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought." 27
HARV. L. REv. 605.
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development. These stages, he says, are four, from the age of
primitive law down to the present day.
The first of these periods, (I shall briefly paraphrase Dean
Pound's argument regarding "the end of law",) is that of primitive or archaic law, and in this stage the idea was merely to
preserve the peace. "In primitive law justice, in the sense of the
end of the legal system, was a device to keep peace." The law
attempted to give the injured party a substitute for revenge, and
the main purpose was that a certain, unambiguous result might
be attained. Thus, law, in this stage, resembles arbitration in
international law, and industrial disputes. Peace is the sole
and final aim. The law in this stage "seeks only to preserve the
public peace, to keep down private war and to coerce peaceable
settlement of private controversies."2
The second stage of the development of law came with the
slow creation of a system of exact rules both substantive and
procedural,-the stage which Dean Pound has called the period
of "Strict Law." Here the point of view is still that of primitive
society, but the "end" of the legal system has advanced from a
mere aim of keeping the peace at any cost to that of the conservation of the general security, by an unvarying system of legal
remedies. The contributions of this period of strict law are "the
ideas of certainty and uniformity and of rule and form as means
thereto." Formalism is the chief characteristic of this stage of the
law. Forms, strictly followed, prevented recurring disputes and
stimulated the memory in a day of few records; but chiefly
forms were "a safeguard against arbitrary action by the magistrate at a time when there was no elaborate body of substantive
This
rules and principles to furnish standards of decision."
argument
chief
the
is
desire to resist arbitrary magisterial action
of those persons who today object to procedual reform. "In
the strict law. . . forms will break but will not bend,"
and the law is strictly unmoral, looking solely to the protection of
the general security by the creation of an absolute and unchangeable norm for human conduct.
The inevitable reaction from the rigors of the strict law came in
the rise of the court of equity, wherein the wrongs done through
the application of these strict rules of common law were attempted
to be righted by the King's Chancellors, who acknowledged only
U ROSCOE POU:D,
June 30, 1917.
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This period identified law with morals,
the "Law of God."
and was mirrored in the civil law of the Continent of Europe in the
struggle toward "natural law." The tendency, as might well have
been expected, was to go too far, and so the uncontrolled will of
the chancellor became a menace which was only curbed by the
development of a system of equity under the remarkable guidance
of that series of able Common Law Chancellors, of whom we
have spoken above.
"Comparing the stage of equity or natural law with that
of the preceding stage we may say that whereas the end in
primitive law is public peace and in the period of strict law
is security, in this stage it is an ethical solution of controversies; that whereas the means employed in primitive law is
composition, and in the strict law legal remedy, in this period
it is enforcement of duty; and that to the contribution of
primitive law, namely, the idea of a peaceable ordering of
society, and to those of the strict law, namely, certainty and
uniformity reached by rule and form, it adds the conceptions
and moral conduct to be attained through reaof good
25 faith
son. "7
We now come to the fourth, or present stage of the law, "a
body of law with the stable and certain qualities of the strict law
yet liberalized by the conceptions developed by equity or natural
law." To this stage Dean Pound gives the name "The Maturity of
Law," and in it the end sought is equality and security, while
property and contract are insisted upon as fundamental ideas.
The principle of individual rights is here developed to its highest
degree, and by the maintenance of these rights the end of "equality
of opportunity and security of ecquisitions" is sought to be
attained.
However,
"As often happens in such connections, we are systematizing the whole law upon the basis of rights just as that
conception is beginning to yield its central position in legal
science because of the discovery of a more fundamental conception behind it." 28
This more fundamental conception toward which we are now
moving is none other than "The Socialization of Law," in which
the interests behind the rights become the primary considerations.
'

5 27 HAIv. L. REv. 220.
27 HARV. L. RSv. 224.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol27/iss1/5

18

Wheat: American Legislation for the Adjustment of Industrial Disputes
ADJUSTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES

"In consequence the emphasis comes to be transferred
gradually from individual interests to social interests. Such a
movement is taking place palpably in the law of all countries today. Its watchword is satisfaction of human wants, and it
seems to put as the end of the law the satisfaction of as many
human demands as we can with the least sacrifice of other de-

mands. "27
Social interests become paramount to individual interests, and
the freedom of an individual to contract in any way that he wills
is held to be inferior to the right of society to see to it that no
other individual be coerced into making contracts not good for
society in general.
VI.

ARBITRATION-A STAGE OF PRIMITIVE LAW.

Such, in brief, is the development of the end of law in legal rules
and doctrines, according to Dean Pound. Where does arbitration
fit into this analysis? Clearly it is a method of quasi-judicial
action which is still in the stage of primitive law. The end to. be
secured is peace. Each case is a separate, and distinct problem,
attacked often by arbitrators unused to the judicial method, and
whose sole aim is to smooth over difficulty which lies directly
before them, with no particular reference to those which have
gone before or those which are to come in the future. In such
a situation it is inevitable that the result should be compromise,
splitting-the-difference, and a casuistry in which future general
security is almost universally sacrificed for present peaceful solution,-regardless of fires of discontent left smouldering below
the for-the-moment unruffled surface. As Dean Pound says:
"When in the course of an industrial dispute today, a
strike occurs or is threatened, we may see a situation that
takes us back to these beginnings of the public administration
of justice. In a primitive social organization the chief agencies
of social control are religion, operating through supernatural
sanctions and given efficacy by the priesthood, and morals,
operating through the sanction of the general moral sense
of the community and given efficacy by the internal discipline
of the clan and the guild. A lesser and feebler agency of
social control is law, operating through the sanction of politically organized force, and given efficacy by the state. In
antiquity, men obtained redress by self-help, by the help of the
27 HRAV. L. REV. 226.
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gods, and by the help of the state. But the state was by no
means the ordinary nor the most effective recourse of the
injured. So today in those occasional types of controversy
for which the law as yet has made no adequate provision or for
which our administrative machinery is inadequate, and hence
men will not or cannot invoke the orderly action of the public
authorities, the self-help of the contesting parties is resorted
to, restrained only by the general moral sense of the community. Thus a season of private war ensues; and private
war as a mode of obtaining redress for private grievances
was the staple of primitive social life. But note how society
endeavors to secure the paramount social interest in peace
and public order when a strike is called today. The disputants, intent only on their own interests, may disturb the whole
order of society. Thereupon all manner of moral and extralegal pressure is brought to bear to induce them to come to
some compromise or to submit to some form of arbitration.
Press, pulpit and platform resound with exhortations, not that
exact justice may be done, but that the dispute may somewhat be adjusted and society be left to pursue its orderly
course. The problem of primitive society with respect to all
disputes was the problem of society today with respect to
industrial disputes: How may disputants be induced to forego private war and made to adjust their controversy without
28
infringing the social interest in the general security?"
The administrator who suddenly finds himself appointed a
member of a State Board of Arbitration and Conciliation is in
no easy position. The disputes which he might be called upon
to adjust come from a welter of different industries, and are
bewildering in their complexity. The arbitrator who would solve
any one of them in a manner that would guarantee peace in the
future as well as a mere peaceful solution of the present difficulty,
would need the assistance of a large statistical body to sift out
the necessary data from the mass of possible evidence. Were
he a person well acquainted with the technicalities of the trade
in question, he might be able to develop in time a certain sensitiveness to the vital points in dispute which would make a series
of successsful awards possible. But he cannot, in the nature of
things, be well acquainted with every industry of the State, unless
indeed the State has but one or two leading industries, and unless
he has extensive statistical assistance and superhuman zeal. Even
so, under ordinary conditions of arbitration, were this successful
28 ROSCOE
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arbitrator to die, his successor would have to start in again exactly
where his predecessor began. No body of principles would come
down to him for guidance. Add to this the fact that the quality of
men on these Boards is frequently much affected by political
considerations, and the probabilities against success are apparent.
On the other hand, it is possible for such a body of principles
to be built up. Mr. Justice Higgins of the Australian Federal
Arbitration Court, has done so for the determination of the minimum wage to be paid in that Commonwealth and for other like
matters. In two recent articles in the Harvard Law Review2" he
describes vividly the methods used in developing the system of precedents and principles, and lists thirty-three "principles of action"
which have been established to guide the court.
What Mr. Justice Higgins has done shows the possibilities where
an extraordinary mind attacks the problem of arbitration in
industrial disputes. In building up his principles, however, he
has not been unmindful of the danger of attaining in his zeal a
stage of strict law which would be worse for the commonwealth
than the anarchy that existed before his court was created. This
is an ever present danger, and it is this direction in which lie the
pitfalls for such bodies as the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations. The public demand is for peace. This has, however,
often been maintained, if at all, only by a continuous series of compromises or open conflicts. In addition, the "consciences" of the
judges of such a court are apt, like those of the chancellors of
old, to vary according to the measures of their respective feet.
The law itself sets forth no standards by which to measure these
consciences; and the "judges" are turned loose upon a sea of industrial turmoil with nothing to guide them but the demand of the
public that "its rights" be maintained inviolate. In the Railroad
Act of 1920 the Labor Board there created is at least given the
foundation upon which far-seeing members may be able to build
principles of action such as have been developed by Mr. Justice
Higgins, for the standard of a living wage is there set forth in
detail.
The first decision of the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations
show a realization of these dangers, and a desire on the part of the
judges to base their decisions upon certain fundamental principles.
The law itself lays down a certain vague norm for their action,29 Henry Bournes Higgins, "A New Province for Law and Order," 29 HARv. L.

REv. 13-39, 32 HARV. L. REv. 189-217.
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i. e., that a "fair wage" should be guaranteed,-and the court
attempts to define such a wage, thus laying the foundation for a
standard which may in time develop as has that of the Australian
Court of Arbitration.3O
That the problem is frought with difficulty may be seen from
the experience of the Federal Board of Mediation and Arbitration
in railway disputes. Says Stockett:
"There has been almost universal condemnation of the
practice in arbitration of splitting the difference between the
demands of the men and the concessions of the employers.
Prof. Adam Shortt, who has served on numerous boards of
conciliation and investigation in Canada, refers to it as a
'demoralizing principle', and Judge Wm. C. Chambers, U. S.
Commissioner of Mediation and Conciliation, when acting as
chairman of the Eastern Firemen's Board in 1913, expressed
the hope that the award would not be a compromise, but in the
nature of a judgment or decree of the court. The employees
have registered their disapproval of compromise decisions both
in the course of arbitration proceedings and in minority reports appended to the awards. Employers, too, have emphasized the necessity of basing wage decisions on some
principle of reasonableness and fairness. In 1913 the railways in the Eastern District refused for a considerable
period to arbitrate their dispute with the firemen under the
provisions of the Erdman Act, partly on the ground that the
award would of necessity be a compromise, and thus work to
their disadvantage. Their attitude was probably the same
as that of a recent investigator who stated, 'It is not absolutely certain but that in exceptional cases a strike or lockout
is a more wholesome culmination of an aggravated dispute
than a series of temporizing and unsatisfactory compromises.' "31
o State of Kansas et al. v. Topeka Edison Co., Docket No. 3254-1-2. Court of
Industrial Relations, Kas., March 29, 1920. In this case the Court says, regarding
a "fair wage":
"The skilled worker, in fairness, should receive a higher wage than the unskilled
worker. The worker who has spent years of time and efforC in preparing himself for
a peculiarly technical line of work is entitled to greater consideration from the public
than the more unskilled worker. The hazards of employment should also be noted
and the worker engaged in such an employment as that under consideration (electrical
linemen) should receive a higher wage than his fellow workmen who may be
engaged in a safe occupation. The degree of responsibility placed upon the worker
Is a matter of importance.
The continuity and regularity of the employment
should be considered, for it is apparent that an employment which is seasonal in its
nature must have a higher wage than one in which regular, steady work is offered,
because, after all, it is the annual earnings that'are to govern rather than the daily
wage, in many instances. By no means the least important consideration should
bo the industry and fidelity of the individual, for the worker who is faithful to his
trust and is industrious, working to the best of his ability in the interest of his
employer, is entitled, as a matter of right, to a greater reward than the worker
who thinks only of his wage and not of the interest of his employer and of the
public who are directly affected by his labors. Perhaps more important than any
other circumstance, however, is the relation of the wage to the cost of living".
(This was the first case decided by this Court.)
31 THE ARBITRAYL
DETERznATION OF RAILWAy WAGES, XV.
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Thus, thinks this writer, arbitration of this haphazard sort
kills itself,-for while the employees are encouraged to make more
frequent, and often swollen demands, knowing that they will be
largely cut, ("Demandez beaucoup si vous soulez peu.") the
employers agree to arbitration only as a last resort. Clearly
the fundamental need is a system or series of principles upon which
the arbitrator may base his decision, unaffected by the desires of
the moment. Thus alone will any real success be possible, and
not until this is done will industrial arbitration cease to be
"merely mediation conducted under the guise of judicial procedure. M2
VII.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPLES.

Between the dangers of developing a stage of strict law and of
leaving all to the "conscience" of the moment, the members of an
Arbitration Board or an Industrial Court must carefully pick their
way. There is unfortunately no hint as yet in most proposals for
arbitration of a real understanding of the basic fact that, so long
as the administrator is not provided with carefully devised norms
to guide his conduct, his justice will always continue to be measured
by the size of his conscience or his foot. In other words, until a
system of basic assumptions carefully defining "a fair wage",
"proper working conditions", "fair day's work", and the like,
is erected, which can fill the place in these bodies the common law
fills in ordinary courts, arbitration will remain in the stage of
primitive law, with the constant danger that the judges themselves,
in their zeal to define the principles under which they are to work,
will build for themselves a system of fixed rules leading to the
unfortunate result of a stage of "strict law."
The three most significant steps in jural development, according
to Dean Pound, are
"(1) peaceable disposition of controversies, (2) attempt
to dispose of causes justly as well as peaceably, (3) attempt
administrato reach justice through rules and
' 3 standards,7tion of justice according to law. ' 3
And in another place:
"The crude solutions brought forth by a policy of peace
at any price can but mitigate, they cannot wholly supersede
Ibid, 193.
ROSCOE POUND,
June 30, 1917.
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the conflicts involved in personal intervention by the wronged
to secure justice. In an industrial arbitration today the
arbitrators must make a decision that "will go, down,' and are
much more anxious to make concessions than to apply prin
ciples or to do even
justice. At all events they seek to termi34
nate the dispute."
This difficulty is universally recognized. The passages from
Stockett, reproduced earlier in this chapter, show the conclusions
of an American observer regarding American conditions. Much
earlier, Mr. Joseph D. Weeks, in his memorable report in 1879
on Industrial arbitration and conciliation in England, voiced the
same complaint regarding arbitration boards, saying:
"When the practical operation of these boards is considered,
a very serious difficulty is found in the absence of any recognized definite principle as a basis upon which awards shall
be made. For example: First and foremost among industrial
questions, is that relative to the wages of labor. When this
is before a board for decision, the question arises at once,
What shall be the basis upon which the award shall be
made'i""5
Speaking of the same English situation at a somewhat later
date, the Webbs remark:
"This growing antipathy to arbitration is, we think, mainly
due to their (the Trade Unionists') feeling of uncertainty
as to the fundamental assumptions upon which the arbitrator
will base his award. When the issue is whether the 'standard earnings' of the Lancashire Cotton-spinners should or
should not be decreased by ten per cent, there is no basis
accepted by both parties, except the vague admission that the
award should not be contrary to the welfare of the community.
But this offers no guidance to the arbitrator. Judge Ellison, for instance, acting in 1879 in a Yorkshire coal-mining
case, frankly expressed the perplexity of an absolutely openminder umpire. 'It is (he said) for (the men's advocate) to
put the men's wages as high as he can. It is for (The
employers', advocate) to put them as low as he can. And
when you have done that it is for me to deal with the question
as well as I can; but on what principle I have to deal with it
I have not the slightest idea. There is no principle of law
involved in it. There is no principle of political economy
in it.' ''a
INDUSTRIAL CONCmTION AND ARBITRATION,
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 229.
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This last statement is hardly correct for each side does rest
its claim upon an economic basis, the trouble being that they do
not agree upon their basic assumptions. Says the Webbs:
"The arbitrator's award if it is not a mere 'splitting the
difference', must be influenced by one or the other of these
assumptions, either as a result of the argument before him, or
as the outcome of his education or sympathies. However
judicial he may be in ascertaining the facts of the case, the
relative importance which he will give to the rival assumptions of the parties can scarcely fail to be affected by the subtle
influences of his class and training. "37
This fact is well illustrated by our own State Boards of Arbitration usually made up of three members, one chosen from the ranks of
labor, and the third a neutral member, ostensibly representing
the public. Almost invariably it has been the case that the first
two 'become mere advocates of their respective constituencies,
the final decision thus being put into the hands of the third
member, or umpire.3 8
A final objection that is often urged against the method of
industrial arbitration is that it is "a weapon of the weak", i. e.,
one who fears defeat if he should have to go ahead and fight it
out. This sentiment has been expressed to the writer on numerous
occasions by labor leaders of different sections of the country.
They admit that arbitration often brings beneficent results,-to
unions that are too weak to fight their battles alone. During
their period of gestation the impartial,- neutral umpire can usually
be trusted to be on their side at least as often as he is on the
other, and so long as the need exists they will gladly consent
to arbitration. True, this feeling is usually unexpressed and
often unconscious, but it is almost always present. "Why should
one agree to 'arbitration' when the chances are that by main
force a greater victory may be gained?" Prussian, if you will,
but strictly human.
The feeling of the party to an industrial dispute that he does
not wish third parties meddling in his business has been clearly
-Ibid., 230.
a The only exception to this general rule known to the writer is that of Mr.
Charles Wood, for many years representative of the employers on the Massachusetts
Board. ir. Wood, whose indefatigible efforts often saved the Board from oblivion,
came to be trusted by labor perhaps more even than was their own members, and
when he left the Board, Mr. Wood was voluntarily chosen as arbitrator in several
large disputes. He confessed to the writer, however, that his success was largely
due to his extraordinary interest in the work, and that he had not attempted to
formulate any set of principles on which to base his awards. A certain genius
for meditation was the secret of his success.
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expressed by Mr. F. W. Meyers, Commissioner of the California
Bureau of Labor Statistics, in the Tenth Biennial Report of that
Bureau,
"One has but to look at the current news of the day,"
says he, "and note therein the vast number of industrial
disputes existing, and the very few thereof in which arbitration was being had or desired by the interested parties. To
understand how little disposition there is on the part of industrial disputants to leave the settlement of their affairs to
outsiders in the cases in which arbitration is invoked, it will
usually be noticed that he who first says, 'Arbitrate' is
ususally not he who feels confident of success, and that it is
the coercion induced by a sense of weakness, or by some
other coercive influence, and not a desire to see even justice
done, which usually induces the willingness to arbitrate."39
In the same general vein Professor Commons says that:
"Arbitration in the proper sense of the term, is a makeshift and a sign of weakness."40
He continues:

"Only imperfectly does it establish justice or guarantee
peace ;-it has been abandoned or limited wherever the parties
have had experience with it.' "'
To Profesor Commons the true solution lies in developing and
fostering the system of "Trade Agreement," i. e., the system of
peaceable collective bargaining and conciliation. He realizes, however, that there is always the possibility that these methods will
not meet with success, and a fatal deadlock ensue, with its danger
of open industrial battle, but concludes:
"If we reduce the matter to its simplest terms we shall
probably find that the occasions where it is necessary to fall
back on arbitration proper are the following:
1. When a representative of either side does not want to
face his constituency in making a concession.
2. When a new union or a new employers' association,
inflated with a novel feeling of strength, finds itself unexpectedly against a hard reality, and looks about for a way
out.
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3. When the parties have agreed between themselves
on all points except one or two, and these have been reduced to such simple terms that any person of integrity
and intelligence can give a decision.
4. When the public is so seriously damaged that it
practically forces
the contestants to submit to outside
42
interference. 1
It is, then, in these exceptional situations, rather than the regular
courses of industry, that Professor Commons believes arbitration to be necessary. Thus the danger of public loss as a direct
result of industrial stoppages induced by industrial disputes may
at times make it imperative that the public, as represented by the
state, should step into the breach and demand a peaceful settlement. If the final end of such public action is to be merely
"peace" we shall remain in the stage of primitive law in which
we find ourselves today. On the other hand, if the law can
develop a system of "rights of hunanity" of at least equal significance to its long-developed system of "rights of property", there
is hope that the future may see an appeal to justice take the place
of open warfare. What the foundations of such principles of
human rights must be will be the province of another chapter.
Industrial disputes, however, are not likely to be ended by any
form of mediation or arbitration yet devised, unless the parties
to such disputes agree upon at least the fundamental relations
between themselves. The problem lies deeper than the mere
smoothing over of disputes. It lies rather in creating a spirit of
conciliation. Most disputes of the present day have their underlying causes in misunderstanding. Such disputes may be peaceable adjusted by mediation and conciliation, but when there exist
fundamental disagreements regarding matters on which both sides
feel that no compromise is possible, no method yet devised will
check the recourse to force. Arbitration in such cases can never
be more than a temporary means for the postponement of open
struggle. Only the careful building up of a general recognition
by both parties of certain fundamentals of the relation between
them will make possible truly successful governmental action for
the adjustment of such disputes. These principles of bargaining,
of wage adjustment, of proper working hours, of decent working
conditions must be worked out to the satisfaction of both sides
before any general era of industrial peace will be possible. Even
42 ZrL
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then, certain matters will remain which either side will consider
fundamental, and on which general agreement will be impossible.
The relation of the State to such matters is a problem for the
future, and the complete elimination of strikes and lockouts
appears, to say the least, dubious. As one writer put it:
"Conciliation and arbitration, whether state created or
mutually agreed upon by the disputants, has proved to be a
failure and utterly worthless as a means of bringing about
lasting peace. At its best it is only a miserable makeshift,
a worn out expedient invented to postpone the evil day through
compromise. Its acceptance by either party to a dispute is
either an acknowledgement of weakness or doubt of the
justice of the positon taken. Power seldom makes any concession and justice does not permit of compromise when a
question of right principle is involved. A principle
is either
43
right or wrong. It cannot be compromised."
Any general agreement, or public recognition of norms of fair
wages, proper hours, decent conditions, and collective bargaining
methods would, however, minimize these "matters of principle"
and put an end to compromise by furnishing accurate standards
for decision. For forty years our States have struggled to find
the way to industrial peace, but little has been done to provide
such standards for decision. These must await a more general
understanding of the problem and a more genuine desire to eliminate open industrial warfare.
VII.

SUMMARY.

We have seen that arbitration, as a method, and as practiced
in connection with industrial disputes, is a type of primitive
adjudication still in the stage of archaic law, and that its end is,
or at least has been up to the present time, merely to bring
peace to the community, regardless of how the methods used
might fit into the general scheme of progress, and regardless of
the danger that future disputes might spring from present compromise.
To square the function of arbitration with the more modern
concept that security and the general social development are
even more important "ends" than mere temporary peace, we have
43 George B. Hugo, "Conditions Fundamental to Industrial Peace", xliv ANNALs Or
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seen that the fundamental requirement is that we should arm the
administrative organs of industrial intervention with a series of
principles and standards upon which they may base their decisions.
These principles, like those of modern equity as developed by
the Common Law Chancellors, would be the norms by which
demands should be measured. With these as a background, the
danger of compromise and splitting-the-diference is minimized.
We have also seen that great care must be taken not to have
such principles crystallize into a mere inelastic series of rules.
This danger of developing a stage of strict law in such bodies as
the "Courts of Industrial Relations" now springing up, is more
serious than is at first apparent, and if allowed to occur will
destroy all the good results which might otherwise be expected
from these bodies.
Finally, if the intervention of organs of the State in industrial
disputes is to be successful, it must be realized that the end of industrial peace alone will not carry us very far,--no farther than
have the illusive experiments of the past forty years. If peace is
the sole end there are other methods far superior to arbitration
or meditation which could be utilized. Among these might be
mentioned governmental assistance toward very powerful unionization," or some method of equalizing the opposing forces by creating a balance of power, or of having both sides to labor agreements
deposit sums of money to guarantee compliance, like bonding a
man to "keep the peace", a plan which has, indeed, been tried
in several instances with considerable success." 5 Certain it is that
the aim of merely producing an industrial truce will not suffice
today, and that the body which attempts it will either fall itno disrepute or be swallowed up in the welter of industrial conflict. As
an American commentator has expressed it:
"The word 'arbitration' makes a sentimental appeal, because
it seems to call for justic.e between man and man. But it
is doubtful whether an arbitrator can possibly satisfy even
himself as to what is justice in a given dispute. The conditions are too complicated, and he las no rules for his
guidance."46
See LAUcHHEDAER, THE LABOR LAW OF MARYLAND.
See Edward Cummings, "Industrial Arbitration in the United States,"

QuA3.

JouR. EcON. 17, July, 1895, in which he described this method as used after a large
English boot and shoe trade dispute.
46 John R. Commons, "Arbitration, Conciliation and Trade Agreement,"

INDEPENDENT, 1440, 1442.
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